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What do people do with thoughts they do not like? Psycholo-
gists have suggested many mental actions that people can take 
to change unwanted thoughts. They can try to change those 
thoughts through deliberative self-persuasion or by searching 
for and exposing themselves to appropriate persuasive infor-
mation (Maio & Thomas, 2007). People can try to change how 
they view their thoughts by reinterpreting or even trivializing 
them (Beck, 1993; Ellis, 1973; Gross, 1998). Indeed, what 
people think about their thoughts (metacognition) can influ-
ence the subsequent impact those thoughts have (see Petty, 
Briñol, Tormala, & Wegener, 2007).
Despite these efforts, unwanted thoughts sometimes per-
sist. People can try to ignore these thoughts, negate them, sup-
press them, correct for them, or think about something else, 
but unfortunately, these mental activities can be difficult to 
implement and do not always work in the intended ways 
(Wegner & Erber, 1992). For example, attempts to negate or 
suppress stereotypes and prejudice can backfire and produce 
an increase in unwanted thoughts (e.g., Gawronski, Deutsch, 
Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, 
& Wheeler, 1996; Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998). 
Also, attempts at correction for unwanted thoughts can lead to 
biases in the opposite direction (e.g., Martin, 1986; Schwarz & 
Bless, 1992; Strack & Mussweiler, 2001; Wegener & Petty, 
1997; Wilson & Brekke, 1994).
Instead of engaging in these effortful mental activities that 
do not invariably produce the desired result, what if people 
could just throw their unwanted thoughts in the garbage as 
they do unwanted objects? But can people discard their 
thoughts as easily as they dispose of objects? Dualist philoso-
pher René Descartes held that the mind is a nonphysical sub-
stance, and thus, mental phenomena are also nonphysical (see 
Cottingham, 1999). According to this classic Western notion 
of dualism, a thought cannot literally be thrown into the gar-
bage, because it does not have a material or physical nature.
However, people might still be able to treat their thoughts 
as physical objects. If so, they could break them into pieces, 
destroy them, and throw them away just as they do physical 
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Abstract
In Western dualistic culture, it is assumed that thoughts cannot be treated as material objects; however, language is replete 
with metaphorical analogies suggesting otherwise. In the research reported here, we examined whether objectifying 
thoughts can influence whether the thoughts are used in subsequent evaluations. In Experiment 1, participants wrote about 
what they either liked or disliked about their bodies. Then, the paper on which they wrote their thoughts was either ripped 
up and tossed in the trash or kept and checked for errors. When participants physically discarded a representation of their 
thoughts, they mentally discarded them as well, using them less in forming judgments than did participants who retained a 
representation of their thoughts. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and also showed that people relied on their thoughts 
more when they physically kept them in a safe place—putting their thoughts in their pockets—than when they discarded 
them. A final study revealed that these effects were stronger when the action was performed physically rather than merely 
imagined.
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objects. There are two reasons that this possibility may be 
plausible. First, psychologists have treated thoughts meta-
phorically as physical objects in order to improve their under-
standing of cognitive processes. For instance, Abelson’s 
(1986) theoretical perspective on the nature of beliefs treats 
beliefs as “possessions.” Models of organizational behavior 
refer to the possibility of “owning” immaterial goods, such as 
organizational knowledge (e.g., Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). Of 
course, the feeling of ownership can be applied to all kinds of 
mental constructs, including scientific ideas and artistic cre-
ations (e.g., Heider, 1958). Second, thoughts are also treated 
like physical objects in nonpsychological domains. For exam-
ple, language is replete with metaphors linking thoughts and 
physicality (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Thus, people talk about 
having, acquiring, borrowing, holding, losing, and abandoning 
their thoughts.
In sum, it may be reasonable to suggest that thoughts can be 
understood and treated as if they were physical objects. What 
remains to be examined is the extent to which researchers can 
move from metaphorical analogies of thought to a more literal 
view of thoughts as physical objects. In the present work, we 
examined the impact of treating thoughts as tangible objects in 
the domain of attitudes.
The goal of the present research was to examine the impact 
on judgment of treating one’s thoughts as external objects and 
performing physical actions with them. We conducted two pri-
mary experiments. In Experiment 1, participants wrote down 
their positive or negative thoughts about their bodies on a 
piece of paper and then either threw that paper in the garbage 
or double-checked the spelling of what they wrote. According 
to the cognition-as-object view, physically disposing of one’s 
thoughts, which suggests that they were unwanted or lacked 
value, would lead to mentally disposing of those thoughts. 
Thus, when thoughts were discarded, participants were 
expected to use their thoughts less in forming judgments than 
participants in the control condition would. In Experiment 2, 
we replicated the thought-disposal effect and added a new 
condition of thought protection.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants and design. Eighty-three students at a public 
high school in Albacete, Spain, participated in Experiment 1 
as part of a course designed to prevent eating disorders (aver-
age age = 15.6 years, SD = 0.69). The students were randomly 
assigned to the cells of a 2 (thought direction: positive vs. 
negative) × 2 (treatment: thought disposal vs. control) 
between-subjects factorial design.
Procedure. The experiment was presented as a study on body 
image. All participants received written instructions asking 
them to complete several tasks. As part of the first task, each 
participant was randomly assigned to generate and write down 
either positive or negative thoughts about his or her own body 
during a 3-min period. In the positive-thoughts condition, par-
ticipants were told to list as many positive thoughts about their 
bodies as they could; in the negative-thoughts condition, par-
ticipants were told to list as many negative thoughts about 
their bodies as they could (e.g., Killeya & Johnson, 1998). 
Examination of the thoughts listed indicated that all partici-
pants followed the instructions.
After listing his or her thoughts, each participant was ran-
domly assigned to either the thought-disposal or the control 
condition. All participants were asked to look back at the 
thoughts they wrote. In the thought-disposal condition, partici-
pants were asked to contemplate their thoughts and then throw 
them into the trash can located in the room, because their 
thoughts did not have to remain with them. In the control con-
dition, participants were asked to contemplate their thoughts 
and to check for any grammar or spelling errors they could 
find.
The dependent variable in our analysis was participants’ 
attitudes toward their bodies. Participants were told that they 
should record these attitudes because their self-image might 
have influenced their previous responses. Attitudes were 
assessed using three 9-point semantic-differential scales (e.g., 
bad-good, unattractive-attractive, like-dislike). Ratings were 
highly intercorrelated (α = .88), so we averaged them (after 
reverse scoring as appropriate) to create a composite attitude 
index. Higher values on this index indicated more favorable 
attitudes.
Results
The dependent measure was submitted to a 2 (thought direc-
tion: positive vs. negative) × 2 (treatment: thought disposal 
vs. control) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Results of the 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of thought direc-
tion, F(1, 79) = 4.26, p = .04, η2 = .046, qualified by a signifi-
cant Thought Direction × Treatment interaction, F(1, 79) = 
5.33, p = .02, η2 = .05. As Figure 1 shows, the difference 
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Fig. 1. Participants’ mean ratings of their attitudes toward their own 
bodies as a function of the type of treatment they received and the 
direction of their thoughts.
Thoughts as Material Objects 3
between the positive-thoughts condition (M = 6.59, SD = 
1.11) and negative-thoughts condition (M = 5.38, SD = 1.31) 
was significant only for participants in the control condition 
(M = 5.55, SD = 1.42), F(1, 79) = 8.44, p < .01, and not for 
participants in the thought-disposal condition (M = 5.62, SD = 
1.06), F(1, 79) = 0.035, p = .85.1
Discussion
Consistent with our hypothesis that a thought-disposal treat-
ment can influence judgments by invalidating people’s 
thoughts, results showed that the attitudes of participants who 
physically threw their thoughts away showed less impact of 
the thought-direction induction than did the attitudes of par-
ticipants who physically retained their thoughts. These find-
ings are consistent with previous research on self-validation 
(Petty, Briñol, & Tormala, 2002), which showed that thoughts 
tagged as invalid or held with low confidence are less influen-
tial than thoughts tagged as valid or held with high confidence 
(see Briñol & Petty, 2009). It is important to note that because 
the treatment was induced after thoughts were already gener-
ated, it could not affect the valence or the number of partici-
pants’ thoughts. Rather, the treatment decreased the strength 
of the influence that participants’ thoughts had on their 
attitudes.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed with five objectives. First, we 
aimed to provide a conceptual replication of Experiment 1 and 
show a decrease in thought use after physical thought disposal. 
Second, we attempted to specify the aspect of the thought-
disposal treatment that was responsible for the effects on atti-
tudes by more clearly isolating the behavioral component of 
the induction. That is, compared with the control group in the 
prior experiment, participants in the control group in Experi-
ment 2 were not asked to read their thoughts again, a process 
that kept exposure to those thoughts constant across the 
thought-disposal and control conditions.
Third, we changed the topic of the thought task in order to 
generalize our findings to a new issue and to rule out the pos-
sibility that thought disposal would work only when the 
thoughts were about the self. Thus, instead of asking partici-
pants to generate thoughts about their bodies, we asked them 
to generate arguments in favor of or against the Mediterranean 
diet (i.e., high consumption of fruits, vegetables, legumes, and 
unrefined cereals, with olive oil as the basic fat; see Willett 
et al., 1995).
Fourth, and most important, a key goal of this experiment 
was to provide an extension of the previous findings by show-
ing that thought use could be increased when participants 
physically kept their thoughts safe rather than discarding them. 
We created a new condition in which participants were asked 
to write their thoughts on a piece of paper and then take their 
thoughts with them. Our expectation that individuals would 
show increased reliance on their thoughts when those thoughts 
were kept safe is related to the logic behind the endowment 
effect. This effect refers to the tendency for people to require 
more money to give up an object they own than they are will-
ing to pay to acquire the same object (Thaler, 1980). That is, 
goods that one owns are valued more highly than identical 
goods that one does not own (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 
1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Similar arguments 
have been made about one’s thoughts. That is, one’s own 
thoughts are seen as better than the thoughts generated by 
others (Greenwald & Albert, 1968; Perloff & Brock, 1980). 
Given that our argument is that thoughts can be treated as 
material objects, we tested whether people would value (rely 
on) their thoughts more when they physically kept (“owned”) 
them versus did something irrelevant to the paper on which 
their thoughts were written (as the control group was instructed 
to do).
Finally, the previous experiment established that treating 
thoughts as real objects can influence attitudes, but it remained 
an open question whether the impact of treating thoughts as 
objects could extend to other outcomes that are the down-
stream consequences of attitudes, such as behavioral inten-
tions. If it could, this would establish that the current 
phenomenon has important real-world implications because 
previous research has established that behavioral intentions 
are the best predictors of behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975).
Considering the findings of the previous experiment, we 
expected participants in the thought-disposal condition to 
show reduced reliance on their thoughts in forming attitudes 
and behavioral intentions toward the Mediterranean diet com-
pared with participants in the control or thought-protection 
conditions. Furthermore, we expected participants in the 
thought-protection condition to show a greater effect of 
thought direction on attitudes and intentions than those in the 
control or thought-disposal conditions.
Method
Participants and design. Two hundred eighty-four under-
graduate students from a public high school in Albacete, 
Spain, voluntarily participated in Experiment 2 as part of a 
course on preventing eating disorders (average age = 16.87 
years, SD = 3.02). They were randomly assigned to the cells of 
a 2 (thought direction: positive vs. negative) × 3 (treatment: 
thought disposal, control, or thought protection) between-sub-
jects factorial design.
Procedure. The experiment was presented as a study on eat-
ing habits. All participants received written instructions asking 
them to complete several tasks. As part of the first task, each 
participant was randomly assigned to list either positive or 
negative thoughts about the Mediterranean diet for 3 min. 
Before listing their thoughts, all participants were reminded 
that a Mediterranean diet involves high consumption of fruits, 
vegetables, legumes, and unrefined cereals, with olive oil as 
the basic fat.
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After listing his or her thoughts about the diet, each partici-
pant was randomly assigned to complete either the thought-
disposal, thought-protection, or control task. Participants in 
the thought-disposal condition received instructions to remove 
the page on which they wrote their thoughts from the rest of 
the instruction booklet and place it in the trash can located in 
the room. In the thought-protection condition, participants 
were instructed to remove the page on which they wrote their 
thoughts from the rest of the instruction booklet, fold it, and 
take it with them in their pocket, wallet, or purse. In the con-
trol condition, participants were told to remove the page on 
which they wrote their thoughts from the rest of the instruction 
booklet and fold the four corners so we could identify that 
page later if necessary.
The dependent variable in our analysis was participants’ atti-
tudes and behavioral intentions toward the Mediterranean diet. 
To assess attitudes, we asked participants to rate the diet using 
seven 9-point (1–9) semantic-differential scales. These scales 
were anchored by the following terms: healthy-unhealthy, desir-
able-undesirable, positive-negative, in favor-against, foolish-
wise, harmful-beneficial, and recommended-not recommended. 
In addition, to assess intentions toward the Mediterranean diet, 
we asked participants three questions: To what extent they 
would be willing to participate in a campaign designed to pro-
mote the diet, to what extent they would eat according to the 
Mediterranean diet in the future, and to what extent they were 
willing to support this diet in any other way. Participants indi-
cated their assessments using 9-point scales ranging from 1 (not 
at all) to 9 (totally). Both attitudes and behavioral-intentions 
items were averaged to form a single index of overall evaluation 
of the diet for each participant (α = .91). Higher values on this 
index indicated more favorable evaluations.2
Results
We conducted a 2 (thought direction: positive vs. negative) × 
3 (treatment: thought disposal vs. thought protection vs. con-
trol) ANOVA on the overall evaluative measure. The analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of thought direction on eval-
uation of the Mediterranean diet, such that participants who 
generated thoughts in favor of the diet held more favorable 
evaluations (M = 6.84, SD = 1.14) than those who generated 
thoughts against the diet (M = 6.35, SD = 1.21), F (1, 282) = 
18.55, p < .01, η2 = .06. More critical, the two-way interaction 
between thought direction and treatment was significant, F (2, 
282) = 42.84, p < .001, η2 = .23 (see Fig. 2).3
To fully interpret this interaction, we conducted a series of 
further contrasts. First, the comparison between the thought-
disposal and control conditions revealed a significant interac-
tion between thought direction and condition (Fig. 2). The 
effect of thought direction on evaluation of the diet was greater 
for control than for thought-disposal participants, t(282) = 
–4.60, p < .001. This pattern replicated the one obtained in 
Experiment 1. For control participants, those who generated 
positive thoughts reported more favorable evaluations of the 
diet (M = 6.78, SD = 0.89) than did those who generated nega-
tive thoughts (M = 6.16, SD = 1.05), F(1, 282) = 6.55, p = .01. 
For the thought-disposal condition, however, the effect of 
thought direction on evaluation was reversed: Participants 
who generated negative thoughts reported more favorable 
evaluations of the diet (M = 7.10, SD = 0.99) than those asked 
to generate positive thoughts (M = 6.27, SD = 1.18), F(1, 282) 
= 17.17, p < .001.4 Stated simply, when people treated their 
thoughts as “trash,” their judgments were the opposite of their 
thoughts. People might be especially likely to do the opposite 
of their thoughts when they have very high doubt about what 
they have in mind, when they overcorrect for the direction of 
their thoughts (e.g., Martin, 1986), or when they are concerned 
about thoughts that are framed or perceived to be represented 
in a dichotomous manner (Beck, 1993; Ellis, 1973).
In the comparison between the control and thought-protec-
tion conditions, the interaction between thought direction and 
condition was also significant. It showed that the new thought-
protection condition led to greater thought use than the control 
condition did, t(282) = 3.87, p < .001. Thus, the effect of 
thought direction on evaluations of the diet was greater for the 
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Fig. 2. Mean evaluations of the Mediterranean diet as a function of the type of treatment 
participants received and the direction of their thoughts.
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thought-protection condition than for the control condition. 
For thought-protection participants, those who generated posi-
tive thoughts reported more favorable evaluations of the diet 
(M = 7.39, SD = 1.01) than did those who generated negative 
thoughts (M = 5.57, SD = 1.01), F(1, 282) = 78.11, p < .001.5
General Discussion
In Western dualistic philosophy, thoughts cannot be treated as 
material objects because they are not a question of matter. 
However, language is replete with metaphorical analogies 
suggesting that thoughts can be understood and treated as if 
they were physical objects. The present research examined 
whether treating thoughts as if they were real could influence 
attitudes and behavioral intentions. In our first experiment, 
relative to control subjects, participants who literally threw 
their thoughts away used those thoughts less in forming atti-
tudes. Our second experiment conceptually replicated this 
finding for a different topic. This study included a new condi-
tion in which participants kept their thoughts in their posses-
sion (e.g., in their pocket). Compared with participants in 
other conditions, those who kept their thoughts showed 
increased reliance on their thoughts in forming their attitudes 
and behavioral intentions.
Given that language contains various metaphors mapping 
thoughts onto physical things (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), our 
research opens the possibility of many other interventions. For 
example, people might be able to protect their thoughts from 
changing if they write them down and hide them prior to a 
counterattitudinal attack.
In addition to extending the results to other actions relevant 
to attitude change and resistance, future research should also 
examine the boundary conditions for these effects. For exam-
ple, would similar actions performed by other people (e.g., a 
friend throwing your thoughts away) have similar effects? 
This question awaits further research. The general idea that 
thoughts can be treated as if they were physical objects is in 
line with recent work on embodied cognition (e.g., Semin & 
Smith, 2008) and situated cognition (e.g., Robbins & Aydede, 
2009), which suggests that the relationship between body, 
mind, and environment is multidirectional.
Another important question is to what extent performing 
the physical action with the thoughts adds anything beyond 
merely imaging that action. Actual performance of the behav-
ior might have a number of advantages over mere imagination, 
such as leading to more complex and richer representations 
(Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 
2005), activating one’s self-concept to a greater extent (Peck 
& Shu, 2009), and functioning as a stronger prime (Dijkster-
huis & van Knippenberg, 1998).6
To address the issue empirically, we conducted a new study 
in which 78 undergraduate students from Universidad Castilla 
La Mancha in Albacete, Spain, were asked to type in the com-
puter their negative thoughts about the Mediterranean diet and 
were instructed to create an electronic file with those thoughts. 
After creating the file, each participant was randomly assigned 
to one of four experimental conditions. Some of the partici-
pants were asked to use the mouse to move the electronic file 
to the recycle bin (physical-disposal condition), whereas oth-
ers were asked to use the mouse to move the file to a storage 
disk (physical-protection condition). These two conditions 
required participants to physically move the mouse with their 
hand in order to move the electronic files.7 In the remaining 
two conditions, participants were asked to mentally imagine 
that they would perform that action, but without having to 
actually do it. That is, half of the participants were asked to 
mentally visualize themselves moving the files to either the 
recycle bin (mental-disposal condition) or to the storage disk 
(mental-protection condition). Finally, participants evaluated 
the diet on the same items used in Experiment 2.
The 2 (dispose vs. protect) × 2 (physically move vs. imag-
ine) ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between the 
two independent variables, F (1, 74) = 15.93, p < .001. Consis-
tent with the findings of the main studies, results showed that 
participants in the physical-disposal condition (M = 7.61, SD = 
1.13) had reduced reliance on their negative thoughts in evalu-
ating the diet compared with participants in the thought-pro-
tection conditions (M = 6.10, SD = 1.15), F(1, 74) = 17.80, p < 
.001. In contrast, we found that the evaluations of participants 
in the imagination conditions did not differ after visualizing 
the action of moving thoughts to be recycled (M = 6.67, SD = 
1.02) or to be stored (M = 7.11, SD = .98), F(1, 74) = 1.73, p = 
.19. Furthermore, the difference between physically moving 
the negative thoughts to the recycle bin and merely imaging 
that action was significant, F(1, 74) = 7.38, p = .008. Similarly, 
there was a significant difference in evaluations between stor-
ing the file and simply imaging doing so, F(1, 74) = 9.87, p = 
.005. These findings provided a conceptual replication and 
extension of the previous findings to a new domain, showing 
that physical actions can be more powerful (even when per-
formed on the computer) than mere imagination.8
Finally, the present research has important practical impli-
cations. For example, therapists have devoted attention to 
approaches that focus on lowering self-awareness of thoughts 
(e.g., Leary, Adams, & Tate, 2006). Treatments that promote 
mindfulness have become particularly popular as a way to 
teach clients to achieve these goals and to develop a more 
objective relationship with their thoughts. For example, patients 
engaged in mindfulness treatments are asked to deal with their 
harmful thoughts by visualizing those thoughts as passing 
material objects in the mind (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007). 
According to acceptance and commitment therapy (Hayes & 
Strosahl, 2004), clients can also be trained to treat their thoughts 
as chess pieces and move them on a real chess board (see also 
Baer, 2006). Although these specific techniques have not been 
tested empirically, they are assumed to produce a variety of 
positive psychological outcomes (e.g., Brown et al., 2007). 
Consistent with this view, the present research has shown that 
detaching and separating (in this case, literally) one’s negative 
thoughts can increase positive evaluations. The very same 
treatment (thought disposal) produced the opposite effect when 
thoughts were positive. This finding suggests that techniques 
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involved in some mindfulness treatments can backfire—at 
least for some people and for some situations, particularly 
those in which positive thoughts are present. Our research also 
suggests a new, simple strategy by which people can develop a 
closer relationship with their positive thoughts (e.g., physically 
carrying them). Taken together, these results suggest that it is 
important to know which specific processes are responsible for 
the reported effectiveness of mindfulness treatments.
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Notes
1. The main effect of treatment was not significant, F(1, 79) = 2.12, 
p = .14, η2 = .023.
2. The attitude ratings alone were correlated with each other when 
averaged to form an overall attitudinal index (α = .90). Similarly, the 
three items of behavioral intentions were highly correlated when they 
were averaged to form a single index of overall intentions toward the 
diet (α = .77). Furthermore, the correlation between attitudes and 
behavioral intentions was significant, r = .58, p < .001.
3. The 2 × 3 ANOVA conducted on just the attitudes measure alone 
revealed that the predicted two-way interaction between thought 
direction and treatment was significant, F(2, 260) = 34.93, p < .001, 
η2 = .20. When this interaction was decomposed, each of the two-
way contrasts was also significant (ps < .05). Mimicking this pattern, 
the 2 × 3 ANOVA conducted on the behavioral-intentions measure 
showed the same effects as for attitudes, revealing that the interaction 
between thought direction and treatment was significant, F(2, 276) = 
49.01, p < .001, η2 = .23. In addition, each of the two-way compari-
sons was significant (ps < .05).
4. For completeness, the interaction between thought direction and 
condition was also decomposed by comparing each pair of conditions 
with the third. First, the interaction was significant when the control 
condition (contrast weight = –1) and thought-protection condition 
(contrast weight = –1) were combined and compared with the thought-
disposal condition (contrast weight = 2), t(260) = −7.24, p < .001. 
There was also a significant interaction when the thought-protection 
condition (contrast weight = 2) was compared with the combined 
thought-disposal (contrast weight = –1) and control conditions (con-
trast weight = –1 ), t(260) = 6.77, p < .001. Finally, the interaction was 
also significant when the thought-disposal condition (contrast weight 
= 1) was compared with the thought-protection condition (contrast 
weight = -1), excluding the control condition from the analysis (con-
trast weight = 0), t(260) = 8.339, p < .001.
5. The interaction can also be decomposed in another way. 
Specifically, when participants generated positive thoughts, protect-
ing those thoughts increased evaluations of the diet relative to the 
control condition, t(282) = 2.97, p = .003. In contrast, when partici-
pants generated negative thoughts, thought protection decreased 
evaluations of the diet relative to the control condition, t(282) = 
−2.44, p = .015. Finally, as implied by the comparison tests just 
reported, the comparison between thought direction and treatment 
(thought disposal vs. thought protection) was also significant. This 
finding shows that the effect of the direction of thoughts on evalua-
tions was greater for thought-protection than for thought-disposal 
participants, t(282) = 9.19, p < .001.
6. Furthermore, the effect of imagination might produce not only 
relatively weaker effects compared with actual performance, but it 
also has some important boundary conditions. For example, mentally 
visualizing a behavior has been found to be a particularly difficult 
task for some people, leading to backfiring effects (e.g., Petrova & 
Cialdini, 2005).
7. The actions used in this program of research (e.g., placing 
thoughts in the recycle bin or in the trash vs. in storage or in one’s 
pocket) appear to have relatively clear evaluative meanings (e.g., 
one’s thoughts were desired or undesired). However, the meaning of 
these actions can vary among individuals and situations. For exam-
ple, if a person is listing facts and desires to remember them, then 
placing the listed facts in storage may not be a better strategy than 
putting them in the trash. In this context, extra effort will need to go 
into remembering facts that are discarded compared with those that 
are saved and therefore easily retrieved later when needed (see 
Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011). Following previous work on subjec-
tive meaning (e.g., Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2006), we argue that if 
the meaning associated with one’s behavior changes, the effect of 
that action on subsequent judgment could also change.
8. Obviously, these results do not imply that imagination can never 
produce significant effects for some people under other circum-
stances (e.g., Anderson, 1983).
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